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ABSTRACT
Background The absence of meaningful end user
engagement has repeatedly been highlighted as a
key factor contributing to ‘failed’ implementations
of electronic health records (EHRs), but achieving
this is particularly challenging in the context of
national scale initiatives. In 2002, the National Health
Service (NHS) embarked on a so-called ‘top-down’
national implementation strategy aimed at intro-
ducing commercial, centrally procured, EHRs into
hospitals throughout England.
ObjectiveWeaimed to examine approaches to, and
experiences of, user engagement in the context of a
large-scale EHR implementation across purpose-
fully selected hospital care providers implementing
early versions of nationally procured software.
Methods We conducted a qualitative, case-study
based, socio-technically informed, longitudinal in-
vestigation, purposefully sampling and collecting
data from four hospitals. Our data comprised a
total of 123 semi-structured interviews with users
and managers, 15 interviews with additional stake-
holders, 43 hours of non-participant observations
of meetings and system use, and relevant organis-
ation-speciﬁc documents from each case study site.
Analysis was thematic, building on an existing model
of user engagement that was originally developed in
the context of studying the implementation of
relatively simple technologies in commercial set-
tings. NVivo8 softwarewas used to facilitate coding.
Results Despite an enduring commitment to the
vision of shared EHRs and an appreciation of their
potential beneﬁts,meaningful end user engagement
was never achieved. Hospital staﬀ were not con-
sulted in systems choice, leading to frustration; they
were then further alienated by the implementation
of systems that they perceived as inadequately
customised. Various eﬀorts to achieve local engage-
ment were attempted, but these were in eﬀect risk
mitigation strategies. We found the role of clinical
champions to be important in these engagement
eﬀorts, but progress was hampered by the hier-
archical structures within healthcare teams. As a
result, engagement eﬀorts focused mainly on clini-
cal staﬀ with inadequate consideration of manage-
ment and administrative staﬀ.
Conclusions This work has allowed us to further
develop an existingmodel of user engagement from
the commercial sector and adapt it to inform user
engagement in the context of large-scale eHealth
implementations. By identifying key points of poss-
ible engagement, disengagement and re-engagement,
this model will we hope both help those planning
similar large-scale EHR implementation eﬀorts and
act as a much needed catalyst to further research in
this neglected ﬁeld of enquiry.
Keywords: electronic health record, engagement,
implementation
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Introduction
Information technology (IT) is increasingly being
utilised to facilitate the sharing of information across
teams and groups of healthcare staﬀ.1 In the hope of
realisingmore eﬀective and safer care, many countries
are actively pursuing the implementation of electronic
health record (EHR) systems through making major
investments in these initiatives.2However, the existing
literature suggests that many IT implementations,
particularly those that involve complex organisational
transformations, fail to realise their full potential, this
often reﬂecting, amongst other things, the lack of
eﬀective approaches to user engagement.3,4
To date, agreeing on a shared deﬁnition of user
engagement in the context of technological inno-
vation in healthcare settings has been diﬃcult, as
approaches and contexts vary signiﬁcantly. Its concept-
ualisation often depends on the technology in question
and the need to accommodate alternate perspectives
of diﬀerent stakeholders, including both implementers
(often focusing on the process of engagement) and
user groups (often focusing on subjective experiences
of this process).5 More speciﬁcally, in relation to
eHealth innovations, user engagement tends to be
conceptualised as a process involvement in as many
aspects of the design, implementation and adoption
processes as possible in order to increase a sense of
ownership and reduce resistance to the introduction
of the new system.6–25 The underlying assumption
here is that users are best placed to understand the
intended context of system use; by contrast, devel-
opers and implementers may lack important clinical
insights, resulting in a lack of understanding of the
potential consequences of technologies for end
users.26,27
England was one of the ﬁrst countries to make
substantial eﬀorts to implement procured EHR sys-
tems into hospitals on a national scale. The National
Health Service Care Record Service (NHS CRS) was
part of a wider program tomodernise the NHS through
the National Programme for IT (NPfIT). The NHS
CRS has been conceptualised as a ‘top-down’ im-
plementation, this reﬂecting its central management,
substantial scale and ambitious implementation time-
lines.28,29 NHSConnecting forHealth (NHSCFH), an
‘arms-length’ government agency, was charged in 2005
with implementing these nationally procured EHR
systems. These included iSOFT’s Lorenzo Regional
Care (henceforth referred to as Lorenzo), Cerner’s
Millennium and CSE Healthcare’s RiO.
In this paper, we focus on the approaches to, and
experiences of, end user engagement in relation to the
implementation and adoption of Lorenzo software
(which is described in Box 1). We conceptualise user
engagement as a form of involvement which will lead
to informed implementation of an eﬀective system
that is assimilated into working practices due to close
alignment with user needs and expectations.We chose
to concentrate on this particular software because it
was – uniquely – planned to be co-created with NHS
organisations and users, which should have facilitated
and greatly enhanced user engagement.6–25 Although
such co-creation models have been studied pre-
viously, the implementation as part of NPfIT was of
particular interest as this diﬀered from the smaller-
scale implementations studied hitherto and oﬀered
potential insights into user engagement within a multi-
organisation and a multi location context.
We thus seek in this paper to build on the existing
user engagement literature in relation to IT in health
care by reﬂecting on the approaches to and experiences
of user engagement in a national implementation of
complex EHRs. Most work to date has focused on
small-scale individual organisation-centred implemen-
tation approaches allowing extensive customisation of
commercial software according to local need.6–25 We
draw in particular on an existing theoretical model of
user engagement from less complex, commercial IT
applications (Figure 1),5 and our own work to explore
approaches to user engagement in the context of
the NPfIT. Based on our ﬁndings, we map out where
the diﬀerences between national implementation and
Box 1 Characteristics of Lorenzo Regional Care implemented as part of the NPfIT
. Lorenzo is a speciﬁc type of web-based EHR software that is built whilst being implemented in the North,
Midlands and Eastern Region (NME) of England covering  60% of the country.
. It was originally planned to be implemented as a single solution across both primary and secondary care
settings, but the scope was subsequently reduced to exclude primary care settings as contracts were
repeatedly renegotiated in order to reduce costs in a climate of increasing economic uncertainty.
. Lorenzo does not exist as yet in its full form, as the original intention was to develop a system in
collaboration with the NHS so that it would address the needs of users. Diﬀerent releases are available as
soon as they are developed in India, where most of the developers are based.
. Although releases have to be implemented consecutively, organisations are to some extent free to choose
which parts of releases they wish to implement according to their needs.
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single organisation-centred implementation approaches
and associated user engagement lie, how engagement
eﬀorts in relation to the NPfIT have been perceived
by users and organisations, and how approaches to
facilitate engagement can be applied more eﬀectively
to large-scale IT implementations. We conclude by
oﬀering some preliminary recommendations arising
from this work that national and international policy
makers and implementation teams may wish to con-
sider.
Methods
Design
For the purposes of this paper, we drew on a subset of
qualitative data collected as part of our national
evaluation of theNHSCRS in English hospitals.28,30,31
In doing so, we focused on the implementation of
Lorenzo as a complex type of EHR software that was
intended to be co-created in collaboration with NHS
staﬀ, and which therefore did not exist in its ﬁnal form
when implementation began.
Our methods have been reported in detail else-
where.28,31 Brieﬂy, data were collected between February
2009 and November 2010 from four ‘early adopter’
hospitals implementing Lorenzo. Participating hospitals
were conceptualised as case study sites and were
purposefully sampled as some of the ﬁrst to im-
plement these new systems.32–35 In addition, we col-
lected data frompolicymakers, system developers and
other relevant stakeholders. Our work drew on socio-
technical principles to explore the complex mutually
shaping interrelationship between social and technical
factors aswell as the user experiences of the technology
over time.5,24,36–42
Data collection
Our dataset comprised a combination of 43 hours of
observational ﬁeldwork and semi-structured inter-
views with 123 stakeholders including users and man-
agers from case study sites. These were complemented
by interviews with an additional 15 stakeholders out-
side hospitals including governmental stakeholders,
developers and representatives from the independent
sector. We also collected and analysed a range of asso-
ciated hospital-speciﬁc (an average of three in each
Figure 1 A model of user engagement based on a literature review of technology implementation in the
commercial sector (adapted from O’Brien and Toms5 with permission of John Wiley and Sons)
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case study site) and national documents, which we
treated as secondary data sources.
Documents, interviews and observations at case
study sites allowed us to investigate how the national
implementation was approached by local management
and received by local users. Examination of national
documents and interviews with a wider range of
stakeholders gave insights into the broader, national
landscape in which these developments were taking
place.
Where possible, data from four hospitals were
collected at two diﬀerent time points, approximately
six months apart, to allow a certain amount of matu-
ration of software development. During this time,
organisations had also expanded their user base and/
or software functionality. This longitudinal data col-
lection allowed us to capture developments over time
as organisations and users worked out the conse-
quences of the nationally implemented system with
incrementally increasing functionality.
Data analysis
Data were collected and analysed by a designated lead
researcher who had overall responsibility for data
collection at all four case study sites (KC), drawing
on the approach outlined by Miles and Huberman,43
and Mason.44 Interviews were transcribed and together
with documents andﬁeld notes uploaded intoNVivo8
software. Initially, data were organised along dimen-
sions identiﬁed in the literature as important for
‘successful’ EHR implementation, whilst still allowing
new categories to emerge. Initial coding dimensions
included technical, human/social, organisational and
macro-environmental factors.45 Across these dimen-
sions, we examined issues relating to user engagement
in more detail by retrieving data from all sources
coded against user engagement. We then examined
the data in this category and developed subthemes,
initially within and then across case study sites and at
diﬀerent time points.43 These were reﬁned based on
seeking complementary contextual data (providing
wider contextual insights into the situation), conﬁrm-
atory data (supporting prior theoretical assumptions
developed from other sources) and disconﬁrming
data (those that did not ﬁt with developed theoretical
explanations). Disconﬁrming data and inconsistencies
between data sources were examined in most detail.
The use of matrices facilitated this analytical process.
Throughout, the approachwas to investigate user exper-
iences and management eﬀorts through an interpret-
ative lens,44 seeking to understand how the new
system and associated engagement eﬀorts were per-
ceived on the ground.
Results
A full summary of our dataset and a brief description
of each case study site are given in Table 1. Our results
broadly conﬁrmed the importance of a number of
factors inﬂuencing user engagement in large-scale
healthcare IT implementations, but they also shed
light on important new dimensions (Table 2).3,20,45–48
We have summarised these graphically, building on an
existing model of user engagement from less complex
commercial technologies in Figure 2.5
We identiﬁed the following subthemes, which will
be considered in turn:
. layers of complexities to engagement approaches
resulting from the national procurement
. usability and customisability issues
. the role of champions and other key individuals
. the complexity surrounding the hierarchical struc-
tures and associated engagement eﬀorts of clinical
staﬀ.
We begin by describing the strategies for user engage-
ment employed within the context of the national
implementation as a whole and in our case study
(Lorenzo) sites in particular. We then describe experi-
ences of user engagement eﬀorts on the ground, before
discussing potential ways forward.
Understanding approaches to user
engagement in the context of a
national implementation
Users generally bought into the overarching vision of
nationally shared EHRs, thereby providing a receptive
basis for the initial ‘point of engagement’ (see Figure 2).
‘Electronic I think it needs to be done now, I think. I don’t
know, I just think the day of paper notes is probably gone
when there’s so much technology around...If you think
about it’s a very ancient way of doing things to write
everything down when there’s so much technology out
there ... Good vision, but whether this system could do it I
don’t know.’ (Interview, healthcare professional)
Naturally, this overall vision encompassed a number
of expectations based on existing needs and the hope
for the new system to address these:
‘The expectation of the service that I had, I mean I went to
a launch a couple of years ago and when they launched it.
It was like ‘‘wow how cool would that be if you could put
in a number and the whole history of someone came up’’,
especially because from the [name of area] we have a lot of
people from away as well and you can actually see what, all
that data and all that information so you get to know the
patient quicker because sometimes the paper notes take
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time to come through and things can be done accord-
ingly.’ (Interview, healthcare professional)
However, the vision of shared EHRs became com-
promised by national arrangements. Although the
government was a signiﬁcant stakeholder in driving
the overall implementation, it did not directly facili-
tate the engagement of users as this responsibility was
largely devolved to individual organisations imple-
menting Lorenzo. As hospital staﬀ were potential users,
hospitals were considered to be in a good position to
coordinate local engagement eﬀorts. As one conﬁden-
tial national document reads:
‘[Engaging clinicians] is seen as a key issue, and any
diﬃculty experienced in engaging with clinicians will
result in a reduction in the speed of the implementation
and in beneﬁts realisation ... [the] devolved approach to
implementation is rooted in the belief that one can only
implement changes to working practices at a local level.
The focus for clinical engagement is therefore at that local
level....’
Local engagement eﬀorts were, however, complicated
by the ‘top-down’ implementation and the nationally
procured nature of Lorenzo software. Here, a close
working relationship between users and management
introducing the change was not possible as implemen-
tation was led by national structures. Local organis-
ations (including users) were not involved in systems
choice, which should have been an important con-
sideration at the initial ‘point of engagement’ (i.e. the
beginning of the process of engagement), building on
the common vision of a national EHR (Figure 2). This
is illustrated by the following extract from a Depart-
ment of Health publication:
‘The Department [of Health] ... decided to conclude the
bulk of procurement activities before focusing on com-
municating with and engaging NHS staﬀ. Wider engage-
ment andmobilisation of theNHSwas not started until [it
was] judged that procurement had reached a suﬃcient
stage of maturity to be able to communicate its outcome
in ameaningful and eﬃcient way. It was concerned that to
have done so earlier might have raised expectations which
were either speculative or may not have been met and
there were also resourcing constraints.’ (Source: Depart-
ment of Health, 2006)49
Table 1 A summary of our data set
Case study
(1) A large-scale
Lorenzo
implementation in
an acute setting
(2) A small-scale
Lorenzo
implementation in
a community
setting
(3) A medium-scale
Lorenzo
implementation in
a mental health
setting
(4) A small-scale
Lorenzo
implementation in
an acute setting
Overarching
54 interviews with
hospital staﬀ, with
a total of 29
diﬀerent
interviewees: 8
operational staﬀ
and 21 users
10 hours of
observations
13 pages of
researcher ﬁeld
notes
Documents:
deployment history
timeline, project
initiation
document,
electronic patient
record next stage
business case
30 interviews with
hospital staﬀ, with
a total of 23
diﬀerent
interviewees: 9
operational staﬀ
and 14 users
24 hours of
observations
Six pages of
researcher ﬁeld
notes
Documents:
project initiation
document, two
project status
reports, several sets
of minutes from a
software steering
group meetings,
interim evaluation
report
22 interviews with
hospital staﬀ, with
a total of 20
diﬀerent
interviewees: 6
operational staﬀ
and 14 users
4.5 hours of
observations
15 pages of
researcher ﬁeld
notes
Documents:
project initiation
document, two
deployment
veriﬁcation reports,
lessons learned
report
17 interviews with
hospital staﬀ, with
a total of 15
diﬀerent
interviewees: 9
operational staﬀ
and 6 users
5 hours of
observations
34 pages of
researcher ﬁeld
notes
17 documents
including Trust
internal
communications,
supplier
documentation and
press coverage
15 interviews with
governmental
stakeholders,
independent and
commercial sector
representatives
Examination of
national policy
documents
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Local stakeholders in hospitals were unlikely ever to
meet the implementers working at a national level, yet
at the same time were under intense political pressure
to implement the selected products:
‘The Public Accounts Committee was quite critical
weren’t they? They were very clear that, I think it was
about six months ago now, they were very clear that if
there hadn’t been substantial progress over the next six/
seven months they were going to look at the whole
strategy (...) you know, shoe horn in something that isn’t
ready ...’ (Interview, manager)
As a result, hospital management found itself trying to
‘sell’ software that it had not chosen to their clinical
and administrative staﬀ. This was a diﬃcult under-
taking as early release software had limited function-
ality and oﬀered little in the way of beneﬁts to
clinicians or patients, and was replacing well-func-
tioning local systems. In addition, they could not
demonstrate the product to its potential users as it
did not exist in its ﬁnal form at that time. These
diﬃculties are exempliﬁed in this interview extract:
‘I’ll never forget this, when we had a Programme Board ...
and they said we have been told by the Secretary of State
Table 2 Main themes identiﬁed, overlap with the existing literature and novel themes
arising from the research
Themes and subthemes emerging from our research Overlap with the existing
literature (Refs)
Technical dimension
Usability 14,17,24,53,61–63
Customisability 8,64–66
Software that is built whilst being implemented
Social/human dimension
A shared vision
A participatory approach to implementation and development 6–18,21–25
Eﬀective integration into existing workﬂows 7,14–16,23,61,62,67–74
Champions and boundary spanners as translators between management and
user worlds
8,10,18,22,24,42,53,55,
61,67,69,75–81
Users’ willingness to participate in engagement eﬀorts
Organisational dimension
Assessment and addressing of user requirements/attitudes/concerns 15,18,25,41,42,61,65–
67,69,79,81–86
Eﬀective communication between developers, management and end users 8,11,22,42,66,67,76,
78,87–89
Eﬀective leadership and incentives for use 6,8,9,11,16,21,22,40,42,
53,61,69,83,89–91
Identiﬁcation and agreed measurement of individual and organisational
beneﬁts throughout implementation
11,16,17,42,53,61,65,
68,80,89,92–95
Eﬀective training and support structures for users 8,10,14,17,21,25,42,62,
64,68,69,80,82,87–
89,91,94–99
Evaluation and monitoring of progress 6,10,14,17,18,21,22,40,50,
53,74,76,83,88,89,100–104
Real versus tokenistic engagement
Clinical versus user engagement
Targeted versus organic engagement – time needed for this to occur
Balance between encouraging and mandating use
Incentives for users versus focusing engagement eﬀorts on non-users
Wider macro-environmental dimension
Engaging on a national scale
Passing user engagement on to local organisations
Nationally procured software – conﬁgurational constraints
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essentially, obviously not personally but through his
agents that we will be deploying this product in this
many Trusts over this period of time and everybody on
the [place] goes ‘‘what? Nobody told us.’’ So then the CIOs
[Chief InformationOﬃcers] had to go to their Trusts, you
know, there’s about seven acute Trusts andMental Health
Trusts and said you’ve got to deploy this product over this
time period, then theywould say tomewhat’s the product
and I’d say I don’t know, there isn’t one but there will be,
trust me, you know, you can imagine what they would say
to that. It’s completely stupid, completely bonkers ...’
(Interview, governmental stakeholder)
Over time, hospital management therefore tended to
lose credibility amongst users. Engagement was in
eﬀect inhibited right from the start as the new system
could not be demonstrated to users, with the conse-
quence that changes in business, clinical and admin-
istrative processes could not be planned for. The ﬁrst
quote below illustrates this lack of credibility, whilst
the second quote illustrates how problems in business
planningwere perceived to impact on eﬀorts to engage
system users:
‘... well I think if you’re trying to promote change which is
what the National Programme is all about, what
informatics was set up to do, then I guess that if you’re
trying to convince someone to change you need credi-
bility don’t you? You need two types of credibility, one
that what you’re trying to do is compatible with their
vision of the future and it’s a good thing to do. And also
youneed them to feel that it’s safe to change, you know, if I
commit a change to my process to take advantage of all
these systems are you going to support me? And that’s
what we’re trying to work up.’ (Interview, manager)
‘... one of the diﬃculties for us as a Trust was that we had
to design our business processes without having access to
the system and I’m sure that’s something that’s been said
throughout all the other Trusts is, you know, when you’re
engaging with clinicians because it’s, you know, it’s being
sold as a clinical product and you can’t show themhow it’s
going to work it’s very hard for them to say well, yea, we’ll
use this bit here and we’ll use that bit here and so for me it
was a challenge.’ (Interview, manager)
Problems with the lack of credibility of the software
were further exacerbated by early negative experiences
withLorenzo,with clinicians expressingconcerns around
increased workload, and hospitals reporting that it
negatively impacted on organisational functioning.
Consequently, users began to disengage with the
system implementation (see Figure 2).
‘It does take a little longer to request an investigation than
it does using a pen and paper and clearly if we’re going to
Figure 2 A model of user engagement emerging from our results
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use an electronic system it needs to be at least as eﬃcient in
terms of time utilisation as the pen and paper otherwise it
isn’t going to get used universally. So that needs to be
improved a little bit but I think it is at an early stage and
there’s a lot of potential to the system.’ (Interview,
manager)
Relevant national bodies (in particular NHS CFH)
and local management (hospitals) attempted to ad-
dress this lack of user engagement with ‘engagement
strategies’ focusing on ‘stakeholder management’ pre-
dominantly aimed at clinical users. These approaches
were designed to mitigate a recognised risk of users
refusing to use the new system. They included targeted
communication of anticipated beneﬁts of usage, train-
ing, the appointment of clinical leads and attempts to
increase users’ input into system design.9,14,50,51 Hos-
pital management’s targeted communication strategies
were illustrated during the following interview:
‘I think it’s aboutwhat arewe communicating, how arewe
communicate that, what are we saying our expectations
are to staﬀ about what are the beneﬁts of this system to
patients and to staﬀ. How can we sell that and we need to
start developing our, we’ve got a communication plan but
we need to start developing that now, we need to start
rolling it out. Sowe’ve got, clinicians, doctors whowant to
use something that’s going to add to their working day not
something that’s going to add more time and more
output.’ (Interview, manager)
Such local engagement strategies within hospitals were
intended to provide a ‘push in the right direction’
through attempts to win over sceptical staﬀ by em-
phasising the likely beneﬁts of use. This sometimes
also involved a certain amount of spin, as the follow-
ing extract indicates:
‘... it’s all about making them [referring to users] feel
valued because ... we’ve got this. It might not always be
entirely the truth, you know, but it makes people feel oh
well yeah and it just makes people that little bit more
compliant to try it, it’s a bit of bribery, it’s people man-
agement.’ (Interview, manager)
These ‘soft’ strategies appeared to work in some
instances, but if they were not successful, the next
management step was to mandate use of the system.
The approaches employed to enforce systems usage
varied but included withdrawing existing paper sys-
tems.
‘I mean there’s the carrot, the stick and then a cattle prod
and, you know, I mean sometimes you have to use a
combination of all three, you know, you wheel and cajole,
you make the technical solutions as easy as possible but,
you know, people generally don’t want to change and
until you force them to change by taking away their paper
they won’t change.’ (Interview, manager)
However, in keeping with Figure 2, these strategies
targeted stages past the ‘point of engagement’, i.e. once
the implementation was already well underway and
users were obliged to use a system that had been chosen
for them by ‘the top’. Most eﬀorts were therefore
focused on targeting disengagement and re-engagement
stages (Figure 2).
User experiences and perspectives of
engagement initiatives
Our results illustrated that user experiences of this
technology implementation and associated engage-
ment initiatives had signiﬁcant consequences for user
engagement. Despite widespread agreement on the
vision, many users became progressively more dis-
engagedover time (Figure 2).Thiswasmost likely shaped
by a lack of system usability and customisability; a lack
of eﬀective clinical champions and other key individ-
uals that could span boundaries between users and
management; and the complexity of the work en-
vironment, its hierarchical structures and associated
engagement eﬀorts aimed particularly at clinical staﬀ.
In relation to Figure 2, strategies to address issues
with disengagement can be placed at the engagement
and re-engagement stages representing mitigating
actions by management. We will discuss each of the
issues and associated user experiences in turn.
Usability and customisability
Lorenzo was designed as it was being implemented,
which potentially allowed signiﬁcant user involve-
ment. However, system choice and local customisability
were limited for reasons of large-scale interoperability,
constraining changes that individual users and organ-
isations could make to the system.
‘I think all the correct elements are there but, you know, I
don’t know really how ﬂexible the system is but I know
there has been some medical input into making it user
friendly for clinical teams, but I think, my feeling is it
would beneﬁt frommore input from clinicians so that we
can get an output that is useful to us. And at the moment
we’re not quite there really and particularly with things
like the generated discharge summary, it’s quite a lengthy
document, it comes out at four sides of A4.’ (Interview,
healthcare professional)
Here, national arrangements and associated layers of
bureaucracy, including a range of governmental and
commercial committees, meant that technical issues
reported by users often remained unresolved for ex-
tended periods. This led to users feeling that they
had not been listened to and contributed to disen-
gagement.
‘... you never get, you never get consulted on anything it’s
just you’re doing it and I think that’s what gets people’s
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backs up really, it’s just that you’re just expected to do it
and there’s no negotiation or, you know, this is why we’re
doing it or anything, it’s just it’s here, get on with it.’
(Interview, healthcare professional)
This was compounded by the diﬃculties experienced
with integrating Lorenzo with existing care practices.
During the period of our data collection, most users
reported that it caused them additional work without
bringing the promised beneﬁts.
‘I think it would be a great system and I just don’t think it
works very well. I don’t know if it’s an appropriate system.
It seems to have a lot of downfalls. But I can actually see
the bigger picture that yes, it would be really good. I just
think we are struggling a little bit with it.’ (Interview,
healthcare professional)
As a result, users often did not actively participate in
communication, engagement and re-engagement eﬀorts
(which we refer to here as strategies that are designed
to address recognised issues with disengagement) initi-
ated bymanagement, a situation whichmay have been
exacerbated by concurrent changes in the health service
and associated ‘change fatigue’.52
‘With all the other changes that are taking place in the
health service I think it was just another thing that just
people think if you ignore it, it will go away and of course
that’s not going to happen but that’s quite often a
perception in the health service with it being so big and
there’s much red tape that you can avoid things.’ (Inter-
view, manager)
Missed opportunities at the ‘point of engagement’
(Figure 2), together with a lack of systems function-
ality and performance, undermined subsequent en-
gagement and re-engagement eﬀorts. A failure to
demonstrate to users that their concerns were being
listened to and acted upon impacted on users’ will-
ingness to invest time and eﬀort in making the new
system work and on the credibility of engagement
eﬀorts, which were described by some users as a ‘fac¸ade’
and ‘tokenistic’, designed to persuade them to use a
system that was viewed as lacking ﬁtness for purpose.
This contributed to disengagement, resistance and a
feeling that there was no real involvement in decision
making.
‘... but we’re only little cogs in a little wheel so they won’t
listen to us so ... yea, we don’t get listened to ... I’m still
waiting three weeks down the line to get my fax machine,
to get a gateway on my fax machine so I can start faxing
again properly cause our fax machine they gave us in the
ﬁrst place wasn’t ﬁt for purpose cause it only does thin
paper and the cards we have to fax are thick, I mean just
something as simple as that....’ (Interview, healthcare
professional)
Champions and other key individuals
There is evidence that the appointment of clinical
leads and ‘boundary spanners’ can be eﬀective as these
individuals often have an insight into ‘both worlds’:
management and clinical.10,42,53 Indeed, we found the
use of such local champions to be valued by system
users and hospital management. As a result, their
expertise and inﬂuence were harnessed where possible.
‘And so you don’t go in and say right we’re going to do
business process management, you know, you have to
facilitate it in such a way that you’re using their language,
that you can convert, you can translate. So I was almost
like an interpreter for them in terms of, you know, no you
don’t go in and say that, don’t you dare do that to them,
leave them alone I’ll do this bit. And there’s also some-
thing about the clinicians, either they rate you or they
don’t, you’ve either got the credibility or you haven’t and I
think that was quite important.’ (Interview, healthcare
professional)
However, centrally appointed, national champions were
viewed by some users as lacking credibility because
eﬀective two-way communication between those in-
dividuals and users did not occur. Similarly, a number
of users stated that some clinical leads, despite their
clinical background, did not seem to be connected
closely enough to those that they were appointed to
represent (i.e. clinicians).
‘I mean they talk about having clinicians as part of the
developers but they’re clinicians that haven’t been clin-
icians for such a long time. I mean there’s [Name] what’s
his name who’s ... Who’s an anaesthetist or was an
anaesthetist but when was the last time he ever had to
input anything on a computer to do anything with a
patient, probably never.’ (Interview, healthcare pro-
fessional)
Clinical engagement versus user
engagement
We further found that, despite a strategy of engaging
clinical staﬀ, guided by local management assump-
tions that if consultants could be ‘won over’ then other
staﬀ groupswould follow, senior consultants did often
not engage in local implementation discussions –
possibly because they had already reached the disen-
gagement stage (Figure 2).
‘Well yeah consultants are kind of, they don’t come to
events you go to them and it’s making sure you go to the
right events and get the right sort of message or you get
one or two consultants, they don’t need to be enthused
about the beneﬁt ... they just need to understand the
agenda and have a view, it might be a negative view but at
least they’re talking about Lorenzo. So we’re actually
starting to engage with what we would class as the senior
stakeholders across the two sites, deliberately engaging
consultants...’ (Interview, manager)
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This may be partly due to the nature of consultants’
work environment, where the timely delivery of patient
care often took priority.
‘Clinicians are also, if they change their working practice
to use these new systems then their tolerance of failure
would I think be a lot less than maybe an accountant or a
traditional user just because of the nature of what they’re
doing. (...) I don’t mean tolerance as in getting cross, they
need access because the sort of environment they’re in,
then if something isn’t working and their process depends
on it, you can’t say to the patient, ‘‘Just sit there for 20
minutes while I hang on at the service desk, everything’s
going to be ﬁne’’.’ (Interview, manager)
The important role of senior consultants in the hier-
archical structures within health care to some extent
justiﬁes the focus on clinical engagement, as does the
fact that they can be both users and managers. This
approach to engagement was therefore based on the
idea of opinion leadership, with consultants mandating
local use. However, consultants delegated many re-
sponsibilities, including data input into Lorenzo, to
their juniors. These arrangements created a situation
in which consultants were often the clinicians with the
least exposure to using Lorenzo.
‘I think it’s more to do with the hierarchy of the clinical
team in that the more junior you are in that clinical team
the more of the admin stuﬀ that you get to do. Or you’re
asked to do, you’re expected to do. And a lot of that admin
stuﬀ is documenting in the clinical notes. So acting as
scribe on the ward round or being asked to place a request
for a patient or whatever and they’re the duties that
Lorenzo supports. So the junior doctors have got more
exposure to the system earlier than the senior members of
the staﬀ which then creates its own problem in that the
seniors are thenmore reluctant to expose themselves with
a new product...’ (Interview, manager)
In addition, our results indicated that the engagement
of non-clinical stakeholders, who were often the most
frequent users of the early Lorenzo functionality,
received far less attention. As a result, these users
were often disengaged, disillusioned and frustrated.
Discussion
Summary of main ﬁndings
This work has enabled us to describe and understand
the consequences of the various engagement approaches
employed in the context of the national implemen-
tation of Lorenzo. The longitudinal nature of this
work has furthermore allowed us to appreciate how
this evolved over time, which has been important in
facilitating the appropriate adaptation of the existing,
commercially orientated model of user engagement
for use in the context of studying large-scale EHR
implementation (Figures 1 and 2).5 Despite the presence
of an overall vision at the ‘point of engagement’, local
engagement eﬀorts have been negatively inﬂuenced by
a lack of user involvement in procurement decisions as
well as implementation timelines, and the nature of
the Lorenzo system itself, which was perceived to lack
usability and customisability. These factors resulted in
notable disengagement of users. The re-engagement
eﬀorts we observed were often approached as risk
mitigation strategies to prevent further alienation of
users, but such strategies had already missed an im-
portant opportunity to initiate engagement (i.e. the
‘point of engagement’). Drawing on local clinical
champions and boundary spanners was found to
have the potential to facilitate re-engagement to some
extent, but non-clinical staﬀ (often the most frequent
users of the functionality) were particularly neglected
in relation to engagement and re-engagement eﬀorts.
Strengths and limitations of this work
Our results have built on the existing literature, which
to date has not considered the complex issue of user
engagement in the context of national EHR imple-
mentations (see Figure 2). By researching sites longi-
tudinally, we have been able to describe local and
national engagement strategies employed and under-
stand the eﬀects of these on users, and the potential
mechanisms involved.
However, our work is not without its limitations.
We have, despite being able to trace developments
over time, investigated the early stages of Lorenzo
implementation only, resulting in limited insights
into the more embedded use of the system. In add-
ition, our clear rationale for focusing on one type of
national EHR system due to its unique features (i.e.
Lorenzo)means that the transferability of our ﬁndings
to other EHR systems and contexts would beneﬁt
from further consideration.
Considering our ﬁndings in relation
to the wider literature
Our results have shown how a national ‘top-down’
EHR implementation conﬂicted with the notion of
user engagement itself, illustrated by political pressure
to implement centrally procured systems, whereby
users lacked system choice and customisability. In
line with this, other authors have argued that partici-
pation in government initiatives may not be as
participatory as it may ﬁrst appear; eventually certain
governmental objectives need to be achieved, with the
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result that these objectives may at some point become
‘too important’ to be participatory.54
Ideally, users would be involved in all aspects of
systems choice, interface design, evaluation, imple-
mentation and sustained development of the software
to ensure that their needs are reﬂected in software
design.6–25 Such eﬀorts should focus on the ‘point of
engagement’ building a solid basis for the future, as
opposed to targeting the disengagement and re-en-
gagement stages. That said, we accept that any ap-
proach to engagement needs to be tailored to the local
situation, balancing the requests of users with organ-
isational and strategic requirements. For example, it is
likely that some user requests will contradict others, or
requests may adversely aﬀect organisational func-
tioning. This therefore necessitates a careful balancing
act of diverse priorities by the implementers.
The literature suggests that user engagement ismost
eﬀective if the system is ‘home-grown’ and custom-
isable.45,55 More typically in such scenarios, a local
need is identiﬁed and users themselves slowly, often
over a period of decades and supported by local man-
agement, change the system to address this need.56
Here, engagement is inherent in the development
process as implementation is driven by users. How-
ever, a small-scale, evolutionary approach does not
address large-scale interoperability. It is also becom-
ing less aﬀordable and in many cases felt to be less
attractive because of the slow pace of development.56
Overall, eﬀective user engagement in large-scale
EHR implementations is complex and in some re-
spects even contradictory. The question of how users
can be involvedwhilst at the same time achieving some
degree of system interoperability remains, but our
work has highlighted the importance of the initial
‘point of engagement’ and the eﬀect of ‘re-engagement’
strategies. In an ideal scenario, the word ‘engagement’
would hardly be mentioned as it would simply ‘be
there’ without the need for anymitigation strategies to
re-engage disengaged users. Our study supports pre-
vious research which found that the issue of engage-
ment only seemed to become important when it was
identiﬁed as a risk to implementation ‘success’, or
oﬀered a retrospective explanation for an implemen-
tation being perceived to be a ‘failure’.57,58 Users may
be primed to this and labels such as ‘stakeholder
engagement strategies’ may therefore arouse such
questions as: ‘is there any reason why I should not
be engaged?’. This could further undermine the con-
cept of engagement and contribute to user alienation
and resistance to implementation.
Implications for policy, practice and
research
It is not within the remit of this paper to debate
whether a national EHR implementation approach
is an optimal strategy, so we concentrate our thoughts
on how to facilitate engagement from this point
forward (see Box 2 for a summary). Our suggestions
may also be transferable to other large-scale IT im-
plementations in the healthcare sector.
In line with the new strategic IT direction of the UK
government, with a growing emphasis on local sys-
tems choice,59 we expect some of the problematic
complexities of a centralised, national approach to
diminish in future. For example, devolving of engage-
ment responsibilities to individual hospitals is likely to
continue and to be facilitated by more local input in
systems choice and tailoring of local systems. How-
ever, it is important to recognise that future imple-
mentation eﬀorts will be likely to require continuous
re-engagement strategies as the ‘point of engagement’,
initially promising as it built on a common vision, has
received far too little attention. The English imple-
mentationcontextwill probably therefore continue to be
characterised by retrospective risk mitigation strat-
egies in relation to engagement and re-engagement, as
opposed to the preferable focus on the initial ‘point of
engagement’.
Box 2 Recommendations emerging from our work to facilitate user engagement in large-
scale IT initiatives in health care
. There is a need to establish a common vision and have user input in systems choice. The focus here should
be on the ‘point of engagement’ as opposed to targeting already disengaged users.
. The system needs to be adequate and customisable.
. Management’s engagement eﬀorts need to be real as opposed to tokenistic.
. Focus on not only clinical but user engagement.
. Allocate suﬃcient time for as much organic engagement to occur as possible.
. Draw on eﬀective (not tokenistic) translators between user and management worlds.
. Explore more eﬀective use of incentives for those who use as opposed to focusing on engaging non-users.
. Get the balance right between encouraging and mandating use.
. Users need to actively participate in management’s engagement eﬀorts.
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The implications for similar ventures internationally
may also be considered. First, a focus on the initial
‘point of engagement’ is vital. This can be achieved by
building on a common vision and user input in
systems choice, which may have to be local by deﬁ-
nition. Second, there is a need to realise that if the
system being implemented is perceived as inadequate
and has limited capability for customisation to local
needs, engagement strategies are likely to fail. Man-
agement focus should therefore be not on engagement
per se, but onﬁnding a solution that works for asmany
members of the organisation as possible to improve
business processes as well as ways of working. Con-
versely, trying to impose a new computer system that
is perceived as inadequate by users without the op-
portunity for it to be changed in appropriate time-
scales is likely to act as an insurmountable barrier to
achieving any degree of user buy-in.
In addition, we argue for the need for user rep-
resentation to go beyond a reliance on medical con-
sultants to understand and promote the views of
diverse staﬀ groups involved in the delivery of health
care. The participation of representatives of clinicians,
administrative staﬀ and patients, in numbers that
reﬂect the scale of the planned eHealth implemen-
tation, should enhance meaningful user engagement
and reduce the challenges to implementing. Further-
more, this could enrich system functionality through
closer alignment with the needs of the service for
which it is intended. This form of engagement un-
doubtedly takes time: users’ time, the time to com-
municate with and listen to users, time to revise
implementation strategies if necessary and time to
customise the product. In addition, suﬃcient resources
will be required to facilitate the availability of users to
participate in engagement initiatives whilst fulﬁlling
the requirements of their employment.
We also accept that engagement strategies may lose
momentum for reasons that may not be anticipated.
In these instances, there are strategies that can help re-
engage users. For example, having a dedicated indi-
vidual to whom users can feed back problems on
behalf of a group or community of users may facilitate
two-way communication between users and imple-
menters. Our ﬁndings indicate that face-to-face con-
tact is often preferred. It is also important that any
such designated individual has the capacity to under-
stand users’ perspectives and their working environ-
ment. This does not necessarily require a personwith a
clinical background, but it needs someone capable of
taking the boundary spanner role, who is able to
‘translate’ between management and users and build
bridges between them.
We oﬀer our model of user engagement in the
context of national EHR implementations (Figure 2)
as a starting point for conceptualising a complex
phenomenon and emphasise the need to test and
develop it further. It is important that future devel-
opments draw on relevant, existingmodels fromother
sectors as user engagement does not only present a
problem in the context of healthcare IT.
Conclusions
Eﬀective user engagement is critical for the successful
implementation of EHR systems but extremely chal-
lenging to achieve, particularly in the context of at-
tempting to implement a large-scale, complex and
nationally procured system such as Lorenzo. In order
to maximise the chances of success for similar initiat-
ives internationally, it is important to allow local
organisations to engage end users eﬀectively, facilitate
organic approaches to engagement and genuinely en-
courage and respond to user input at all stages of the
implementation process. This includes focusing eﬀorts
on the initial ‘point of engagement’ by building on a
common vision and by allowing user input into system
choice. Mitigation strategies can be helpful but there is a
need to recognise that these are often focused on re-
engagement.
Approaches need to shift from mechanistic models
of clinical engagement–disengagement–re-engage-
ment towards models that recognise the importance
of the ‘point of engagement’, drivers for diﬀerent groups
of users, the need for continuous communication and
key local individuals who are capable of being boundary
spanners.
In relation to the implementation of EHRs in
England, the new governmental direction including
greater local systems choice and the resulting devolve-
ment of engagement activities to individual hospitals
is likely to facilitate user re-engagement.60 However,
local eﬀorts will need to focus on implementing soft-
ware that is ﬁt for purpose, which can be realised by
user-informed design, and the coherent communi-
cation of the implementation strategy if users are to
trust that their eﬀorts to make the system work will
eventually result in beneﬁts.
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